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INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently expending significant effort in both
Iraq and Afghanistan to shape each respective government and
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transform each country into a stable democracy. This endeavor, in
turn, has also shaped—or even transformed—the U.S. approach to
armed conflict by forcing policymakers and military commanders to
find solutions to the seemingly intractable problems associated with
developing countries and their relative instability. This focus on
reconstruction and stabilization has led to the rise of “stability
operations”—a relatively new addition to the military lexicon.1
Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded,
damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical
infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation
for long-term development. Stabilization is the process by
which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in
violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and
reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for
successful long-term development. Together, reconstruction
and stabilization comprise the broad range of activities
defined by the Department of Defense as stability operations.2
The Department of Defense (“DoD”) defines “stability operations”
as military missions, tasks, or activities conducted in foreign
countries and in coordination with other instruments of national
power “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and
provide essential government services,” reconstruct emergency
infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian relief.3 Concomitant with the
ascendance of the concept of stability operations has been an
increase in calls from key lawmakers for “a well-organized and
strongly led civilian counterpart to the military in post-conflict

1. See Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need
for a New Strategic Paradigm, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 45.
The doctrine of stability operations is a new peculiarity in military literature
typically described in a fashion that at first blush appears to be miscellaneous
to the traditional function of the military. The term, in and of itself, connotes
military operations which are ‘not war’ and missions seemingly best left to
civilian agencies to execute.
Id. at 50. See generally Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The
“Organic Minimalist” Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing state-building and legal reconstruction).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07: STABILITY OPERATIONS ¶
1-56 (2008).
3. U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0: JOINT OPERATIONS
V-1 (2008).
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zones.”4 There are numerous reasons to welcome civilian
involvement in stability operations. Civilians can offer a degree of
expertise in certain technical fields that the military might lack.5
Likewise, civilians may sometimes be perceived as less threatening
to the developing state and its citizenry. Neither of these reasons,
however, holds out as an immutable truth, nor can it be said that
military personnel fundamentally lack what civilian personnel may
provide.
Moreover, as recent years have demonstrated, stability and
reconstruction operations are not confined to peaceful areas of the
world. To the contrary, such work is often undertaken in areas of
persistent conflict, where reconstruction is taking place amidst the
bombing and large-scale destruction wrought by military activity.6 It
is perhaps the most apparent paradox of modern warfare that this
seemingly dissonant combination of simultaneous reconstruction and
destruction is, in fact, the confluence of forces toward a common
goal: to eliminate those “who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy,
security, or economic interests.”7
4. See Senator Richard Lugar, Address at the National Defense University
(Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=253067
&& (suggesting that the Secretary of State could lead the civilian-side operation to
promote inter-agency cooperation and knowledge).
5. See Michèle Flournoy, Training and Education for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, in WINNING THE PEACE: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 126, 131 (Robert C. Orr ed., 2004) (arguing that the
U.S. military’s civilian-run divisions give the United States the greatest capacity to
assist in post-conflict operations ).
6. See H.R. COMM. ON ARMED SERV. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., DEPLOYING FEDERAL CIVILIANS TO THE
BATTLEFIELD: INCENTIVES, BENEFITS, AND MEDICAL CARE 10 (Comm. Print
2008).
Over the course of more than seven years of war, nearly 10,000 federal
civilian employees have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to support
security, political, and economic development. While certainly unique in scale
and complexity, the stability and reconstruction missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan are also unprecedented in their risk to our deployed citizens.
Some claim these posts are exposed to such a high level of threat that most
civilian personnel would have been evacuated from them in the pre-9/11 era.
There are few safe places in countries where terrorists, militia, insurgents, and
criminals are seeking power and attempting to undermine efforts to establish
legitimate governments.
Id.
7. National Security Presidential Directive 44 on Management of Interagency
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The result of this shift in the paradigm of armed conflict has been
the creation of a grey zone of activities that are neither clearly
civilian nor military in nature. What is now called “stability
operations” is a hybrid area that fuses a core military mission with a
field of knowledge and experience that is dominated, at least in
theory, by civilians. Often the relevant experience for the successful
conduct of stability operations is shared between civilians and
military. Even when the relevant expertise is civilian in nature, it is
generally the military that must provide the security and logistical
capabilities to enable the operation.8 As a result, strategic parlance is
now characterized by references to “integrated civil-military
planning teams that establish mechanisms for rapid response.”9
Civilians and military personnel now, as never before, find
themselves intertwined in a new grey zone that does not fully belong
to either of them.
But there are legal ramifications for the civilians who operate
within this grey zone. Importantly, there is yet another grey area
surrounding the question of what conduct disqualifies a civilian from
the protections and immunity traditionally given to civilians during
armed conflict. The resultant lack of clarity can translate into
significant legal consequences—both for civilians who are mobilized
pursuant to such an effort and for U.S. policymakers who seek to
criminalize the conduct of terrorists and insurgents.
This article explores the phenomenon of U.S. government civilians
who engage in stability and reconstruction operations in conflict
zones and their legal status under the law of armed conflict, paying
specific attention to the corps of federal civilians being developed for
this specific purpose: the Civilian Response Corps. The discussion
herein reveals that the field of stability operations is a hybrid area
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, Office of the Press Sec’y
(Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter NSPD 44], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
nspd/nspd-44.html.
8. See Jackie Northam, ‘Civilian Surge’ Plan for Afghanistan Hits a Snag
(NPR radio broadcast Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=112976965 (questioning whether the military succeeds in
its task to secure an area and allow the civilian experts to move around the country
freely).
9. Int’l Sec. Assistance Force [ISAF], COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, at 2-21
(Aug. 30, 2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf [hereinafter ISAF].
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that requires both civilian and military resources to attain a common
objective—a fact that conflates the purposes and goals of both, and
necessarily colors the civilians engaging in such work with a military
tint. This hue of belligerence can translate into serious liability when
considering the rather elastic approach some elements of the U.S.
government have taken when determining which activity deprives
civilians of their protections under international law. Ultimately, this
article posits that the complex nature of civilian operations is such
that neither the military nor civilians can be extricated from it.
Accordingly, U.S. interests are best served by articulating a single,
formal, and more restrictive interpretation of what it means to
“directly participate in hostilities.”

I. THE RULES ON TARGETING CIVILIANS
As Professor Yoram Dinstein notes, there are fundamental
distinctions between civilians and combatants under the Law of
International Armed Conflict.10 This distinction, first formally
articulated in the St. Petersburg Convention, is a “norm of customary
international law applicable in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.”11 The International Court of Justice
has noted that this principle, known as the principle of distinction, is
one of the “cardinal principles” of the law of international armed
conflict.12
International treaties also reflect this basic proposition. Article
51(3) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
10. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27 (2004) (defining combatants as “[m]embers
of the armed forces of a belligerent Party (except medical and religious personnel .
. . ), even if their specific task is not linked to active hostilities” and “[a]ny other
persons who take an active part in the hostilities”).
11. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
VOLUME I: RULES 3 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of weakening enemy
forces during war instead of targeting the civilian population).
12. Id. at 5; see also JOSEPH S. NYE, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND HISTORY 25 (5th ed. 2005) (“The
prohibition against intentionally killing people who pose no harm also helps to
identify why terrorism is wrong. Some skeptics argue that ‘one man’s terrorist is
just another man’s freedom fighter.’ But under just war doctrine, you can fight for
freedom, but you cannot target innocent civilians.”).
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(“Protocol I”) states that civilians enjoy immunity from attack during
international armed conflict “unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities.”13 Such language reflects the general rule
that combatants are allowed to attack other combatants and military
targets but are prohibited from targeting civilians. The underlying
rationale behind this distinction is to “ensure . . . that international
armed conflicts be waged solely among the combatants of the
belligerent Parties.”14 The operative legal framework for armed
conflict, therefore, allows a degree of protection to civilians—but
that protection is not absolute. To the contrary, it is tied to the
requirement that civilians abstain from active participation in
hostilities.15
As noted, such protection applies similarly in non-international
armed conflict, as well as the concomitant caveats. For instance, the
protections of Common Article 3 to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions apply only to “persons taking no active part in the
hostilities.”16 Likewise, Article 13(3) of 1977 Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-international Armed Conflicts (“Protocol II”) deprives civilians
who participate in hostilities of both the general protection against
the dangers arising from military operations and immunity from
attack.17 The loss of such protections is significant because these
individuals can then be lethally targeted (i.e., killed), are not entitled
to POW status upon capture, and “may be tried by an opposing
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 51.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
14. DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 27.
15. See id.
Lawful combatants can attack enemy combatants or military objectives,
causing death, injury and destruction. In contrast, civilians are not allowed to
participate actively in the fighting: if they do, they lose their status as
civilians. But as long as they retain that status, civilians ‘enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations.’
Id.
16. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention] (applying by its terms to “armed conflict not of an international
character”).
17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) arts. 13.1, 13.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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force’s judicial system for actions taken while directly participating
in hostilities.”18
Violation of the prohibition on targeting civilians has been made
punishable by international bodies such as the International Criminal
Court, which criminalizes “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities.”19 Similarly, such acts have been
made punishable by the Military Commissions set up by the United
States in the wake of September 11. The Military Commissions Act
of 2006 imposes criminal liability on any person subject to its
provisions who “intentionally engages in an attack upon a civilian
population as such, or individual civilians not taking active part in
hostilities.”20 In the event that a targeted civilian is killed, Military
Commissions can even subject the accused to the death penalty.21
There is widespread agreement that violators of this international
norm should be prosecuted (at least in some forum) and multiple
mechanisms have been created in which to do so.
It must be noted that there are multiple disagreements surrounding
various aspects of Article 51(3) of Protocol I and its requirements.
Chiefly, there is great dispute regarding the temporal scope of the
loss of protection—the question of the duration of the loss of
protection once the activity in question is undertaken.22 More
expansive readings of this temporal requirement have been criticized

18. See Eric Robert Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in
Hostilities, 19 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1398462
(analyzing current interpretations of the phrase “direct participation in hostilities,”
and asserting that a given entity’s chosen interpretation is driven by self-interest).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
20. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t (2) (West 2009).
21. Id.
22. See Eric T. Jensen, U.S. Army JAG Corps, Targeting of Persons and
Property, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY
PERSPECTIVE 37, 48 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009).
On one end of the spectrum is the civilian who directly participates one time
and then ceases his participation. Is he targetable until the end of hostilities?
On the other end of the spectrum is the civilian by day and guerilla by night
who carries out a continuous pattern of hostile acts against his foes. Is he only
targetable while conducting the actual nighttime raid?
Id.
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as providing “light switch” protection or “revolving door” protection
to terrorists or insurgents and have, quite understandably, been the
source of much criticism and objection.23 The focus of this article,
however, is on a much more basic question in the “direct
participation” analysis. Rather than explore the length of time during
which protections are lost, this article focuses on what types of
activities trigger the loss of protections in the first place.
It is widely acknowledged that the activities in question must have
at least three basic elements: the activity must be harmful to a party
to the conflict, there must be a direct link between the action and the
harm, and there must be a “belligerent nexus” such that the act
supports a party to the conflict to the detriment of another.24 As far as
which acts serve to throw off the mantle of protection described
above, Articles 4(A)(4) and (5) of the Third Geneva Convention
provide an illustrative list of activities that are not considered to be
direct participation. Those are as follows:
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply
contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization, from the armed forces
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that
purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and
apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of
international law.25

23. See id. at 49 (raising the issue of whether certain groups of individuals may
be considered constantly involved in hostilities, such as those who take part in
hostilities intermittently); see also Michael N. Schmitt, War, International Law,
and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century:
Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors
or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 535 (2005) (illustrating this debate
with “the image of the civilian who is a guerilla by night and a farmer by day”).
24. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 47 (arguing that while these criteria are
standard and generally accepted, there is much debate over the practical
application of these factors).
25. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 16, arts. 4A(4)-(5).
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But aside from that expressly proscribed area, there is little
guidance or agreement on what other sorts of activities would (or
would not) divest a civilian of the protections offered by
international law. As such, the extent to which civilian participation
in hostilities results in the negation of their protected status is not
easy to discern. As the International Committee for the Red Cross
(“ICRC”) study on customary international humanitarian law flatly
notes, “A precise definition of the term ‘direct participation in
hostilities’ does not exist.”26 Likewise, other scholars have
commented on the pronounced difficulty in defining the extent and
limits of “direct participation in hostilities.”27 Dinstein explains:
It is not always easy to define what active participation in
hostilities denotes. Usually, the reference is to “direct”
participation in hostilities. However, the adjective “direct”
does not shed much light on the extent of participation
required. For instance, a driver delivering ammunition to
combatants and a person who gathers military intelligence in
enemy-controlled territory are commonly acknowledged to be
actively taking part in hostilities. There is a disparity between
the latter and a civilian who retrieves intelligence data from
satellites or listening posts, working in terminals located in
his home country. Needless to say, perhaps, a mere
contribution to the general war effort (e.g., by supplying
foodstuffs to combatants) is not tantamount to active
participation in hostilities.28
There is, therefore, little agreement on anything except the fact
that the definition is an unsettled area of international law.29 This
state of affairs has led to a degree of latitude in interpretation. But
latitude in interpretation is often coterminous with legal
indeterminacy. Further, as one scholar has noted, “The more
confused a concept, the more it lends itself to opportunistic

26. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 11, at 22.
27. See Schmitt, supra note 23, at 533 (positing that the definition of “direct
participation in hostilities” seems require “but for” causation, as well as some
knowledge on the civilian’s part that the action would cause harm).
28. DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 27-28.
29. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51
A.F. L. REV. 1, 28 (2001) (emphasizing that common belief does not limit “direct
part” to actual fighting, but can also include harm to personnel or equipment).
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appropriation.”30 Accordingly, and quite predictably, international
actors with varying agendas and equities have articulated
significantly different interpretive views of what it means to directly
participate in hostilities. These views can be roughly separated into
two schools of thought existing at polar ends of a conceptual
continuum: (1) a restrictive view that seeks to limit the range of
activity by which a civilian loses legal protections, and (2) an
expansive view that seeks to permit the targeting of a wider range of
civilians.

A. THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW
The more restrictive approach to interpreting Article 51(3) and the
meaning of “direct participation” posits that the only acts by civilians
which qualify as direct participation in hostilities are those that
“cause ‘actual harm’ to personnel and equipment where there is a
‘direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the
harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity
occurs.’”31 Urging such a restrictive position, the ICRC has proposed
that the definition of direct participation be limited to civilians who
“carry out acts, which aim to support one party to the conflict by
directly causing harm to another party, either directly inflicting
death, injury or destruction, or by directly harming the enemy’s
military operations or capacity.”32 Professor Michael N. Schmitt, in
noting the high threshold for an act to qualify as “direct
participation,” has posited that this approach implies a direct link
between the activity in question and its immediate consequences, and
that “[p]erhaps the best tack when analyzing a particular act is
assessing the criticality of the act to the direct application of violence
against the enemy.”33 Even so, it is important to note that not all
30. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2006).
31. Douglas W. Moore, Twenty-First Century Embedded Journalists: Lawful
Targets?, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 1, 20 (quoting CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL.,
COMMENTARY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 516 (Yves Sandoz et al eds., 1987)).
32. ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, Feb. 6,
2009,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/directparticipation-ihl-faq-020609.
33. Schmitt, supra note 23, at 534 (contrasting activities such as the
“provi[sion] of strategic analysis” with others such as the “creation, analysis, and
dissemination of tactical intelligence” for particular military targets, and
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activities in question must be related to the application of deadly
force against the enemy. In fact, Professor Schmitt has argued that
using a “kill chain” as an analytic tool for determining “direct
participation” is too restrictive because “not all military operations
seek to weaken the enemy in this fashion.”34

B. THE EXPANSIVE VIEW
The expansive view of “direct participation in hostilities” would
permit a broader range of civilians to be legitimately targeted based
on a wider range of activity. Although there is not yet a fully
coherent U.S. position on the matter, it is clear that the United
States—which is not a party to Protocol I35—takes a broader view of
“direct participation” and, therefore, extends the range of civilians
who may be lawfully targeted. As one U.S. Navy Judge Advocate
(“JAG”) has noted, “The United States interprets ‘direct
part[icipation]’ more broadly than the Additional Protocol I
signatories, and does so through the prism of self-defense.”36 The
U.S. DoD Law of War Working Group has opined that U.S. civilians
may divest themselves of their immunity from intentional attack “if
there is: ‘(1) geographic proximity of service provided to units in
contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship between
services provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) temporal
relation of support to enemy contact or harm resulting to enemy.’”37
That same group has chosen “active part[icipation]” as their
preferred term to describe the point at which a civilian becomes at
suggesting that the former should not be considered critical to efforts in the same
way as the latter) .
34. Id. at 533 n.89.
35. See ICRC, Additional Protocol I Ratifications, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf
/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited May 31, 2010) (listing States
Parties to Protocol I); see also Michael J. Matheson, Opening Remarks at the Sixth
Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law
and The 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 415, 420 (1987) (noting that certain portions of Protocol I are
considered by the U.S. to reflect customary international law).
36. Albert S. Janin, Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to SelfDefense/Protocol I Marriage, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 82, 89.
37. Id. at 89 (quoting INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, & OPERATIONAL LAW
VOL. II I-10 (2006)).
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risk from intentional attack, and has defined “active” participation as
“[e]ntering the theatre of operations in support or operation of
sensitive, high value equipment, such as a weapon system.”38 Such a
view, while fairly constrained, is still broader than the ICRC’s
position that the civilian must be directly causing harm (death,
injury, or destruction) to another party or “directly harming the
enemy’s military operations or capacity.”39
Still, certain elements of the U.S. military have advocated for an
even more expansive “functionality test,” which does not turn on
whether actual harm resulted from the civilian action in question and
does not measure geographic or temporal distance from the conflict.
Instead, the “functionality test” assesses the validity of the civilian
target “based upon the importance and level of functions carried out
by civilians on the battlefield.”40 Accordingly, “[t]aking part in
hostilities . . . is not regarded as limited to civilians who engage in
actual fighting,”41 and certain mission-essential civilians working on
a military base during an international armed conflict could be
subject to direct attack.42 Likewise, pursuant to such a view, a
“civilian entering the theater of operations in support or operation of
sensitive, high Value [sic] equipment, such as a weapon system” has
directly participated in hostilities and has lost his or her protection.43
A U.S. Army JAG has even opined that “[t]his permissive theory
makes it conceivable that journalists who are in direct support of
modern military operations could lose their immunity like other
civilians accompanying the force.”44 Lisa L. Turner and Lynn G.
Norton noted the creeping prominence of this view:
38. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 143 (Keith E. Puls ed., 2004),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-war-handbook2004.pdf.
39. ICRC, supra note 32.
40. See Moore, supra note 31, at 21 (expanding the definition of belligerents to
include civilians who “direct[ly] support” enemy hostile operations).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE 6
(1995), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p690_47.pdf.
42. Turner & Norton, supra note 29, at 31.
43. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Ass’t for Law of War Matters,
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Regarding the Law of War Status of Civilians
Accompanying Military Forces in the Field, § 3(a) (May 6, 1999) (on file with The
American University International Law Review) [hereinafter Parks Memo].
44. See Moore, supra note 31, at 21 (detailing just how broad the U.S.’s
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The Judge Advocate General School of the Army recently
adopted this view teaching “the contract technical advisor
that spends each day working with members of an armed
force to make a weapon system more effective . . . is
integrated with [the] force, [and taking an] active role in
hostilities, [and therefore] may be targeted.”45
Such a view seems to have found a role in Afghanistan, where
reports indicate that certain drug traffickers with ties to the
insurgency are now being targeted in the same manner as
combatants. A recent report by the Congressional Research Institute
notes that the United States is interpreting international law in such a
way as to allow military commanders “to put drug traffickers with
proven links to the insurgency on a kill list, called the joint integrated
prioritized target list.”46 Such a broad interpretation of “direct
participation in hostilities” practically equates facilitation of the
military effort (in this case financing) with direct participation.
Although this issue will be addressed in detail below, it is worth
noting here that a legal analysis equating mere financing of an
insurgency or war effort with “direct participation” is problematic on
a number of levels. Emphasizing the complexity of this issue and the
problems with so broad an interpretation are recent reports that
NGOs working in Afghanistan, as well as certain U.S. contractors,
have been paying mafia-style protection money to Taliban and tribal
warlords.47 Although such conduct obviously merits punishment, it
“functionality test” might be).
45. Turner & Norton, supra note 29, at 31 (quoting Protecting Human Rights
During Military Operations, 48TH GRADUATE COURSE DESKBOOK 15-3 (Int’l &
Operational L. Dep’t, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army,
2000)); see also Jensen, supra note 22, at 55 (implying that this view also applies
to non-international armed conflicts, during which “government forces routinely
treat[] organized opposition groups as much like an ‘enemy’ as they would the
armed forces of opposing States during international armed conflicts”).
46. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RES. SERV., AFGHANISTAN:
NARCOTICS
AND
U.S.
POLICY
16
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf (“The military places no restrictions
on the use of force with these selected targets, which means they can be killed or
captured on the battlefield.”).
47. See Congress to Probe Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan,
CNN.COM, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/17/
afghanistan.contractors.probe/index.html (questioning whether parts of a nearly
$2.2 billion contract in Afghanistan were diverted to pay local warlords and the
Taliban “for security”); William Dowell, Analysis: Rising Threat to Aid Agencies
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would seem rather extreme to argue that such persons are no longer
protected civilians and could, therefore, be attacked with impunity.
Nonetheless, in the end, there remains a divergence of conflicting
and competing opinions as to what “direct participation” entails. The
concept remains fluid and open to interpretation. As such, whether a
civilian becomes a lawful target based on certain activity is subject to
debate and will depend upon both the facts of the individual case and
the analytical framework chosen. Whatever the case, it is apparent
that use of the functionality analysis represents an extremely broad
view and permits the targeting of civilians for a much broader range
of activity than that permitted under Protocol I.

II. STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVILIAN
PRIMACY
The reconstruction seen taking place amidst such large-scale
destruction in modern conflicts is not the only paradox associated
with stability operations. Another is the fact that civilian agencies are
ostensibly at the helm of stability operations—even though such
operations are now considered a “core U.S. military mission.”48 On
December 7, 2005, President George W. Bush issued National
Security Presidential Directive 44 (“NSPD 44”), which was designed
“to promote the security of the United States through improved
coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and
stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or
in transition from conflict or civil strife.”49 This directive signaled the
official recognition that failed or failing states posed a threat to U.S.
in
Afghanistan,
GLOBAL
POST,
Sept.
18,
2009,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/090916/rising-threat-aid-agenciesafghanistan (discussing investigations into payments by international contractors to
the Taliban, via Afghan subcontractors, in exchange for guarantees of safety in
Taliban-controlled regions); Justin Huggler, Afghan Candidate Calls for Expulsion
of ‘Corrupt’ NGOs, EZILON INFOBASE, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.ezilon.com/info
rmation/article_9624.shtml (quoting an Afghan political candidate's allegations
that "[a]bout 20 per cent of all the funding to NGOs is spent on ‘commissions’
which are bribes to government officials to win contracts").
48. U.S DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.05: MILITARY SUPPORT FOR
STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) OPERATIONS ¶
4.1 (2005) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05], available at
http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/HFN/documents/DoD_Directive_d300005p.pdf.
49. NSPD 44, supra note 7.
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national security interests—a threat that U.S. government agencies
would need to mitigate or counter. The directive declares that:
The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the
capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries
or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from
conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable
path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market
economies. The United States should work with other
countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it
whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when
necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security,
development, democratic practices, market economies, and
the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments
abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and
to prevent those territories from being used as a base of
operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized
crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign
policy, security, or economic interests.50
A notable aspect of this effort, designed to prevent “territories
from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists,
terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to
U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests[,]”51 was the
recognition that civilians would play the lead role in such efforts.
NSPD 44 expressly states, “[t]he Secretary of State shall coordinate
and lead integrated United States Government efforts . . . to prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”52
Accordingly, the Department of State—a civilian agency—is
theoretically in the lead role for such initiatives.53
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. (assigning primary responsibility for carrying out NSPD 44 to the
Department of State, and proclaiming that efforts shall be coordinated with the
Secretary of Defense “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S.
military operations across the spectrum of conflict”). But see Richard Weitz,
Obstacles to a Successful Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS
INST. ANALYST, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5077
(suggesting that the Obama administration and its NATO allies will struggle to
staff a civilian “surge” in Afghanistan because “the State Department is seeking to
hire only a few hundred more development experts for Afghanistan,” leaving the
U.S. military to make up the shortfall with tens of thousands more troops on the
ground).
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Military doctrine, as one might expect, conforms to NSPD 44 and
reflects the primacy of civilian leadership in stability operations. As
one U.S. Army Field Manual notes, “[t]he Department of State is
charged with leading and coordinating U.S. Government efforts to
conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations.”54 Nonetheless,
in spite of the civilian lead, stability operations have been made a
central part of the modern military’s functional competence. The
U.S. military has historically performed such operations with
regularity,55 but in recent years, the ascendance of stability operations
has been both revolutionary and rapid. In November 2005, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued DoD Directive 3000.05, entitled
“Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.”56 The directive expressly
declares that “[s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission
that the [military] shall be prepared to conduct and support.”57 That
same directive notes that, during times of armed conflict, stability
operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations
and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD
activities.”58 For purposes of the U.S. military, stability operations
are consequently “on par with combat operations.”59
But the role of civilian leadership is not limited to backseat
coordination from the comfort of a federal office building. U.S.
government civilians are actually putting their boots (or loafers) on
the ground in areas of persistent conflict and conducting the difficult,
hands-on work of stability operations.60 This civilian involvement
54. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-04: LEGAL SUPPORT TO THE
OPERATIONAL ARMY app. D ¶ D-7 (2009).
55. See Tasikas, supra note 1, at 49 ("Since the early 1990’s, the United States
has been involved in seven post-conflict stability operations—roughly one nationbuilding mission every two years.”).
56. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05, supra note 48.
57. Id. ¶ 4.1.
58. Id.
59. See Timothy Austin Furin, Legally Funding Military Support to Stability,
Security, Transition, and Re-construction Operations, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2008, at
1, 1 (detailing how the DoD “elevated stability operations to a core military
mission” as part of a response to strong public criticism of early stabilization
efforts in Iraq).
60. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010)
[hereinafter U.S. DoS PRTs].
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has assumed numerous forms, such as the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (“PRTs”) in Iraq and Afghanistan,61 and has led to the
repurposing of more agency-specific initiatives, including the use of
the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance, and Training (“OPDAT”) 62 and other
Department of Justice personnel in those same theatres of
operation.63 Likewise, myriad other federal agencies are contributing
personnel to operations overseas in which the U.S. government is
waging stability.64
Most notably, civilian participation in stability operations is
evolving into a more coherent and organized force. In addition to its
other effects, NSPD 44 created the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (“S/CRS”). S/CRS’s core mission
The front-line operatives in the campaign to stabilize Iraq are the American
and Coalition members who comprise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
or PRTs. These are relatively small operational units comprised not just of
diplomats, but military officers, development policy experts (from the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in fields such as rule of law,
engineering, and oil industry operations) who work closely with Iraqi
provincial leaders and the Iraqi communities that they serve. While PRTs
dispense money for reconstruction projects, the strategic purpose of these
civil-military field teams is both political and economic. By building
provincial governments' ability to deliver essential services and other key
development projects to local Iraqis, PRTs help to extend the reach of the
Iraqi government to all corners of the country and help build the stability
necessary to complete the transition to full-Iraqi control.
Id.
61. Id.
62. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International
Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1005 (2007) (remarking that OPDAT
focuses on providing assistance to other states as a means to engender “foreign
cooperation” with U.S. efforts to combat various threats).
63. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Sends 25
Advisors to Iraq in Support of Provisional Authority Effort to Reconstruct
Criminal System (May 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003
/May/03_ag_267.htm (announcing the deployment of civilian lawyers, judges, and
court administrators to Iraq to assist with restoration of law and order).
64. See U.S. DoS PRTs, supra note 60 (listing other government agencies that
conduct reconstruction efforts in Iraq, such as the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the Department of Agriculture); see also KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES
THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN
AMERICAN LAW 180-81 (2009) (discussing the “blurring of military and criminal
justice efforts” post-9/11, in that military technology was increasingly used to
respond to domestic crime).
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“is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian
capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help
stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil
strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy
and a market economy.”65 To accomplish this mission, S/CRS has
begun assembling the U.S. Civilian Reserve Corps (“CRC”)—a
corps of civilians who will rapidly be deployed overseas in order to
respond to “critical international crises.”66 This civilian “corps,”
which is designed to work closely with the military,67 will be
comprised of civilian experts who will be able to assist with projects
involving engineering, public administration, economics, and the rule
of law. The CRC is designed to perform its function in post-conflict
situations, as well as in areas of persistent conflict.68 Like the
military, the CRC will possess both active and reserve branches.69
Though the CRC had broad bipartisan support, Congress
delayed funding the initiative until 2008, when the Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Iraq and Afghanistan (PL 110-252) allotted a
mere $55 million for the program.70 For the 2010 fiscal year, the
House of Representatives passed the State, Foreign Operations, and
65. U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction &
Stabilization, http://www.state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm (last visited May 31,
2010).
66. See Melanne A. Civic, U.S. Dep’t of State, A U.S. Government
Coordinated Civilian Stabilization Initiative, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Stab_Ops/
Civic%2017%20Apr.pdf (reviewing the expectations of the NSPD 44 and
explaining how the creation of the CRC will assist in meeting those expectations).
67. See id. (stating that the CRC is intended to “work with U.S. military” to
help create stability).
68. Cf. id. (noting that the State Department’s pilot team of civilian responders
has “deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, Nepal, Liberia, Lebanon,
and Kosovo”).
69. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Civilian Response Operations (July 15, 2008),
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/107027.htm (describing the active component as
comprised of full-time, direct-hire employees of the State Department, and the
standby component as comprised of federal employees who “maintain their current
position but can be called to deploy . . . to unconventional, challenging
environments”).
70. See SCOTT CARLSON & MICHAEL DZIEDZIC, U.S. INST. OF PEACE,
RECRUITMENT OF RULE OF LAW SPECIALISTS FOR THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS 2
(2009), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_0109_2.PDF
(outlining the creation of the S/CRS, which was intended to address a need for rule
of law development specialists by providing funding to civilian-military
initiatives).
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Related Programs appropriations bill,71 which includes $125 million
for the program72—a significant increase that is, in all likelihood,
indicative of the increasing popularity of the program.73
What is important to note about the CRC is that its mission is
not purely humanitarian in nature. To the contrary, the mission of the
CRC is indissolubly bound to U.S. national security, which is
apparent not only in the method of its inception (through a National
Security Presidential Directive) and in its sources of funding
(through bills passed for “war funding”),74 but also in the sort of
training its members receive. CRC training includes a course at a
U.S. Marine base, which covers “weapons familiarization,” “hostage
survival,” “mission planning,” “land navigation,” and “highthreat . . . road driving techniques.”75
Comments from the CRC’s leadership also evidence the Corps’
concern for national security. For instance, Ambassador John Herbst,
coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in comments
delivered to students at the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, recently noted that “[the CRC’s] ability to
respond to countries in chaos is an essential part of protecting the
United States.”76 Citing threats to global security posed by
71. H.R. 3081, 111th Cong. (2009).
72. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-187, at 6 (2009) (stipulating that the funds be used
“[f]or necessary expenses to establish, support, maintain, mobilize, and deploy a
civilian response corps”).
73. See Robin Wright, Civilian Response Corps Gains Ground, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 2008, at A19 (noting the increase in funding reflects the government’s
goal “to avoid repeating the disastrous U.S. experience in [reconstruction and
stabilization] during the early days” in Iraq).
74. See, e.g., Friends Comm. on Nat’l Leg. [FCNL], War Bill Includes Money
for Civilian Peacebuilders (July 10, 2008), http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?
item_id=3375&issue_id=130 (advocating for the Civilian Response Corps as a
way for the U.S. to prevent and resolve violent conflict around the world by
increasing the capability of the US to re-build during the peace process).
75. See Eythan Sontag, Summertime SNOE: Fieldcraft Training for the
Civilian Response Corps, DIPNOTE: U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG, Aug. 31,
2009,
http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/fieldcraft_training_civilian_response_corps
/ (describing the State Department’s training program as “atypical” but intended to
train civilians to effectively and safely work in the “unconventional and austere
environments” where CRC employees are deployed).
76. Will King, Ambassador Discusses Role of Civilian Response Corps, FORT
LEAVENWORTH LAMP, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles
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international terrorism, narco-terrorists, piracy, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction to demonstrate the need for an entity
like the CRC, the Ambassador further noted that, “[t]oday, an
ungoverned space thousands of miles away can represent a national
security challenge to the United States.”77 As the CRC’s website
states, “[i]f U.S. national security interests are at stake, we must be
prepared to respond quickly with the right civilian experts.”78 The
CRC is, therefore, properly viewed as a U.S. national security
instrument.

III. THE STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE
CORPS
Under a normal interpretation of the law of armed conflict, the
CRC’s members are immune from attack and cannot be made lawful
targets. As such, any attack on a member of the CRC would
constitute an international crime punishable under any of the
international justice mechanisms designed to regulate such conduct.
As previously discussed, however, a civilian who engages in certain
behavior loses immunity from attack, thus rendering the targeting of
the civilian legitimate and defensible. Given the noted lack of
determinacy in the definition of “direct participation in hostilities,”
the status of members of the CRC will depend on the actions
undertaken by this nascent entity, and on the analytical framework
used to evaluate those actions.

A. STATUS OF THE CRC UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW
Under the more restrictive view of “direct participation,” the
activities of the CRC are evaluated to determine if they cause “actual
harm” to personnel and equipment and if “there is a ‘direct causal
relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the
enemy at the time and the place where the activity occurs.’”79 The
/2009/09/10/news/news3.txt.
77. Id.
78. U.S. Dep’t of State, Introduction to the Civilian Response Corps,
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QRB
(last visited May 31, 2010).
79. See Moore, supra note 31, at 20 (quoting Parks Memo, supra note 43).
Moore asserts that this approach does the most to protect civilians accompanying
armed forces from being lawfully and intentionally targeted by the enemy.
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range of activities that the CRC will undertake is strikingly broad.
The Corps currently lists five “core organizational functions:”80
conflict prevention, planning, civilian response operations, strategic
communication, and resource management.81 Each of these
categories is broad enough to encompass a vast swath of activities,
all of which are geared toward building and maintaining
governments in areas of crisis.
Given the conflation of stability operations with military
objectives, one could potentially argue that there is no distinction
between providing reconstruction or state-building assistance and
pursuing a military objective. But key to this analysis is the
requirement of “actual harm.” Under a more restrictive analysis,
nothing that the CRC does would constitute direct participation in
hostilities because nothing that the CRC does results in actual harm.
All of its activities are designed to be reconstructive, as opposed to
destructive. Rather than cause harm to personnel or materiel, the
CRC’s focus is on the broad set of activities required to rebuild and
help manage states.82 The CRC’s mission does not envision the
commission of acts of force or violence against the enemy, nor
would any of its activities directly link to some destructive
consequence.83 Accordingly, pursuant to that restrictive view,
civilian members of the CRC are not lawful targets under the law of
armed conflict.

B. STATUS OF THE CRC UNDER THE EXPANSIVE VIEW
The analysis becomes more problematic when viewing the
activities of the CRC under the more expansive view, to which the
U.S. adheres. Using the “geographic, functional, and temporal ‘direct
part’ determination” articulated by the U.S. DoD Law of War
Working Group, the CRC members would likely retain their
80. U.S.
Dep’t
of
State,
Core
Organizational
Functions,
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c15213.htm (last visited May 31, 2010).
81. Id.
82. See Wright, supra note 73 (describing the Corps’ role as taking charge of
“entities including local police, courts, the banking system and airports after states
collapse or governments are defeated”).
83. CRC, Mission Statement, http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=
public.display&shortcut=4QXJ (last visited May 31, 2010) (stating that the CRC’s
mission is aimed at “post-conflict situations,” transition, stabilization, and
reconstruction).
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protected status as civilians. While there may be geographic
proximity of service, it would be difficult to characterize the CRC’s
work as “provided to units in contact with the enemy.”84 Further,
there would be little in the way of “proximity of relationship”
between services provided and harm resulting to the enemy, given
that most of the “services provided” would be reconstructive efforts
not geared toward causing any destructive effect. Finally, because
any link between the reconstructive work and a disadvantage to the
enemy would be speculative at best, there would be no real temporal
relationship between the support given by the CRC and the resultant
harm to the enemy.85 Such a test would, therefore, yield the same
result as the more restrictive ICRC approach.
However, if we approach the CRC’s activities using a
“functionality test,” which assesses the validity of the civilian target
“based upon the importance and level of functions carried out by
civilians on the battlefield,”86 then the status of civilian members of
the CRC is far less clear given the previously discussed link of the
CRC to the war effort. In addition, the importance of civilian
personnel in counterinsurgency has been repeatedly and publicly
described as essential to defeating insurgents such as the Taliban.87
For instance, General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of U.S.
and NATO forces in Afghanistan, was unequivocal in a recent
statement:
[The International Security Assistance Force] cannot succeed

without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support
the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and
acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts. Effective civilian
capabilities and resourcing mechanisms are critical to
84. See Janin, supra note 36, at 89 (citing the DoD Law of War Working
Group’s “direct part” test and its requirement that a civilian have geographic
proximity to such units).
85. See id. (referencing the DoD Law of War Working Group’s requirement
that there be a temporal relationship between the civilian’s services and actual
harm to the enemy before that civilian’s immunity from attack is compromised).
86. Moore, supra note 31, at 21.
87. See, e.g., ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21 (describing how effective civilian
reconstruction efforts are necessary to support and capitalize on the
counterinsurgency achievements); Weitz, supra note 53 (describing the new
Obama administration’s strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan, which
includes an increase in civilian personnel to “improve governance and rule of law
throughout the country”).
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achieving demonstrable progress. The relative level of
civilian resources must be balanced with security forces, lest
gains in security outpace civilian capacity for governance and
economic improvements. In particular, ensuring alignment of
resources for immediate and rapid expansion into newly
secured areas will require integrated civil-military planning
teams that establish mechanisms for rapid response.88
The effort to defeat the enemy, therefore, necessarily relies, in
General McChrystal’s assessment, on the presence of civilians who
work alongside the military toward a common goal. It is important to
underscore that the objective of the mission, to which General
McChrystal refers, is to “disrupt,” “dismantle,” and ultimately
“defeat” the enemies of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.89 In
this effort, civilian and military goals are conjoined. The role of
civilian reconstruction is thus inseparably linked to the enemy’s
insuccess.
According to an expansive “functionality” test, how does one
classify a group of civilians who are funded through a war
appropriations bill, receive training at a military base, expressly see
U.S. national security as the impetus for their missions, and work
alongside the military in conflict zones toward a common goal of
vanquishing the enemy? Further, how does one classify such a group
when its field of operation is considered a “core military mission”
and top military commanders deem that group’s participation
essential to secure the enemy’s submission?
It seems that the functionality test allows targeting of the CRC
under such circumstances. If, as with Afghan drug traffickers, mere
facilitation and “direct participation” are considered coterminous,
then civilians working to further a U.S. military objective cannot
retain their protected status. The alignment of their purpose with the
military goal, the critical role they play in the success of the military
mission, and their “comingled” status (through funding, training,
etc.) make them as much a target as any other facilitator or missionessential civilian in an armed conflict. As a result, if adherence to the
functionality test is legitimate, targeting members of the CRC would
likewise be legitimate. Accordingly, none of the desirable results of
88. ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21.
89. Id. at 1-1.
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prohibiting attacks on civilians would inure to the CRC’s benefit. For
instance, those who target civilian members of the CRC would have
a strong defense if tried before entities like the U.S. Military
Commissions—at least if prosecuted for the crime of “intentionally
engag[ing] in an attack upon a civilian population as such, or
individual civilians not taking active part in hostilities.”90

IV. MOVING THE CRC FROM BENEATH THE
SHADOW OF BELLIGERENCE
As the discussion above demonstrates, the combined “grey
zones” of stability operations and what constitutes “direct
participation in hostilities” leave civilians in something of a
quandary. The field of stability operations in which civilians work is
now a core military mission—meaning success in their objective is
coextensive with military success. Likewise, due to the lack of a
formal, unified view of what constitutes “direct participation in
hostilities,” myriad actors in the U.S. government have posited
competing positions, some of which are strikingly broad and would
serve to deprive civilians working in stability operations (including
in the CRC) of their protected status under international law. So what
can be done to resolve this conundrum and to move the CRC out of
the shadow of belligerence and back into a clearly protected status?

A. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
DISENTANGLEMENT
It is tempting to seek to resolve this quandary at the
institutional level and attempt to “dissipate the grey” by somehow
disentangling stability operations, the role of the military, and the
work of the CRC. For instance, funding for the CRC could instead
come from a civilian source unassociated with armed conflict, rather
than from the war supplementals, which now fund its operations.
Likewise, its mission statement and the rhetoric of its directors could
place less emphasis on national security and adopt a more
humanitarian tone. But there does not seem to be much room beyond
such superficial measures for meaningful disentanglement because
the complex field of stability operations in areas of persistent conflict
requires the intensive use of both military and civilian resources.
90. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t (2) (West 2009).
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In that regard, the topic of the relative role of civilians and military
personnel in stability operations has been a salient one in recent
years. Specifically, the assumption of critical roles in U.S. foreign
affairs by the military has been the subject of angst in some quarters
and, within the parlance of this popular conversation,91 has been
referred to as the “‘militarization’ of diplomacy.”92 Commentators
have attributed this phenomenon to the lack of administrative
capacity on the part of civilian agencies. A report by the American
Academy of Diplomacy notes:
[O]ur foreign affairs capacity is hobbled by a human capital
crisis. We do not have enough people to meet our current
responsibilities. Looking forward, requirements are
expanding. Increased diplomatic needs in Iraq, Afghanistan
and “the next” crisis area, as well as global challenges in
finance, the environment, terrorism and other areas have not
been supported by increased staffing. Those positions that do
exist have vacancy rates approaching 15% at our Embassies
and Consulates abroad and at the State Department in
Washington, DC. USAID’s situation is even more dire.
Today, significant portions of the nation’s foreign affairs
business simply are not accomplished.93
Some of this current discussion has been critical of the
increasing role of the military, arguing that the military lacks the
expertise necessary for stability operations.94 But recent experience
has demonstrated that the contractors frequently employed by
civilian agencies, such as those employed by the Department of State
to make up for its lack of organic capacity, lack the expertise or
91. See, e.g., Matt Armstrong, Pushing Humpty Dumpty: The Rebuilding of
State, MOUNTAINRUNNER.US, http://mountainrunner.us/2009/08/humpt_dumpty.
html (Aug. 21, 2009, 12:03 EST) (questioning whether the militarization of U.S.
diplomacy efforts is a positive development); Posting of Tony Carson to Carsons
Post, http://carsonspost.wordpress.com/2007/11/07/us-militarization-of-diplomacy/
(Nov. 7, 2007) (examining the economic cost to the U.S. of the “militarization of
diplomacy”).
92. AM. ACAD. OF DIPLOMACY, A FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET FOR THE FUTURE:
FIXING THE CRISIS IN DIPLOMATIC READINESS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See id. (asserting that the military lacks “sufficient experience [and]
knowledge” to complete tasks that should be the responsibility of as-yetunderstaffed civilian agencies like the State Department).
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training necessary for success in such endeavors. As one recent
newspaper report noted, “[n]early two-thirds of the 276 Foreign
Service members who volunteered to serve in Iraq next year were
found unqualified for the jobs, aggravating a shortage that has left
the State Department scrambling to fully staff its embassy and other
operations in the country.”95 Likewise, in the face of potential
deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State
endured a minor revolt among many of its members who refused to
go to such conflict zones, creating serious staffing problems.96
Moreover, after years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian
agencies still lack the administrative and logistical capacity to deploy
into those areas.97 In September 2009, John Nagl, president of the
Center for a New American Security, a Washington, D.C.-based
defense think tank, opined:
I think that quite simply there is not sufficient civilian
capacity in the U.S. government to do what needs to be done.
And we have not built that capacity. The civilian side still
needs to develop some of the doctrine, some of the
organization, some of the force structure that’s required to
meet the demands.98
One potential reason U.S. civilian agencies lack the relevant
expertise and are not prepared—culturally or administratively—for
such operations may lie in the fundamental nature of stability
operations in areas of persistent conflict. Given the discussion above,
it is worth considering whether the issue is not actually the
militarization of diplomacy but, to the contrary, the civilianization of
stability operations. Otherwise stated, it could be argued that the
tasks associated with stability operations—a core mission of the U.S.
military—are properly seen as so intrinsically military in nature,
especially in the context of persistent conflict, that their function
95. Nicholas Kralev, Bidders Unready for Jobs in Iraq; Move Volunteers Seen
Unqualified, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at A1.
96. E.g., HARRY W. KOPP & CHARLES A. GILLESPIE, CAREER DIPLOMACY:
LIFE AND WORK IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE 83-84 (2008) (describing the State
Department’s serious difficulty in filling staff positions for Arabic speakers and for
personnel prepared to serve in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict areas).
97. See Northam, supra note 8 (noting further that the State Department faces
the challenge of finding personnel who are both qualified and “willing to stay in
Afghanistan for a yearlong deployment”).
98. Id.
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should necessarily be carried out by military personnel. According to
such a view, the remittance of such tasks to the military was neither
an unnatural event nor a shameful act of abandonment by the U.S.
State Department, but the natural assumption by the military of tasks
proper to its functional competence.
In evaluating the issue through this prism, phenomena such as the
inability of civilian agencies to staff positions in conflict zones, the
lack of expertise on the part of the contractors hired to fill those
positions, and the conclusion that conducting stability operations
equates to “direct participation in hostilities” could be viewed as the
predictable corollaries of a certain consistent logic. This logic
revolves around the premise that stability operations in conflict zones
are more military than civilian in nature.
Such a view, however, is challenged by the urgency with which
military commanders have pressed for greater civilian involvement.99
Civilians now occupy an obviously important role in
counterinsurgency and cannot be excluded from the equation without
sacrificing a key resource that U.S. commanders desperately need.
But if “there is not sufficient civilian capacity in the U.S.
government to do what needs to be done,”100 and the military “cannot
succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts,”101 then
there is little that can—or should—be done at the institutional level
to unbundle this mass of government capabilities. The civil-military
symbiosis that characterizes stability operations is appropriate and
compelled by the complex nature of state-building and the sundry
capabilities that must be brought to bear in order to attain success in
such endeavors. Disentanglement is simply not an option.

B . FORMALLY ABANDON THE FUNCTIONALITY TEST
If solutions to this quandary cannot be found at the
institutional level, then another option that should be considered is
the abandonment of the functionality test by the U.S. government
and the formal adoption of a singular, alternate, and more restrictive
interpretation of “direct participation in hostilities”—a position that
99. See ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21 (arguing that success is not possible
without civilian resources).
100. Northam, supra note 8.
101. ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21.
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applies throughout every part of government and crystallizes the U.S.
position on the matter. This interpretation could be an approach to
direct participation in hostilities that is more in line with the
“Protocol I” approach.102 Alternatively, the U.S. government could
formally and expressly adopt the DoD Law of War Working Group’s
“geographic, functional, and temporal” test as the standard for all
civilians across the board, supplanting the use of the functionality
test and restoring a degree of ideological purity to the U.S. approach.
While this test would certainly restrict the spectrum of potential
targets, there would also be some advantages. For instance, the
articulation of such an approach would serve to increase U.S.
military interoperability with other nations that have ratified Protocol
I or that have adopted similarly restrictive views. In addition, such a
move would serve to reinforce the protections the United States
wishes to preserve for its growing body of contractors and other
civilians who accompany the U.S. military into conflict zones.
Importantly, this test would also limit the ideological dissonance
(and lack of clarity) in U.S. policy on this matter and enable a less
Janus-faced approach. As one commentator has suggested:
Just as it is in the United States’ interest to argue for a narrow
interpretation of [direct participation in hostilities] in order to
protect its civilians and contractors from attack, it is also in
the United States’ interest to also argue for a broad
interpretation of [direct participation in hostilities] in order to
more easily justify the targeting and attacking of terrorists. It
appears as if the United States is trying to have its cake and
eat it, too.103
Abandoning the functionality approach and formally articulating
either a “Protocol I” approach or a “geographic, functional, and
temporal” test would simultaneously bring an end to the current
schizophrenic policy position, foster greater protection for U.S.
civilians working in conflict zones, allow military commanders clear
guidance on targeting civilians, and deprive terrorists and insurgents
of defenses to their conduct when they target U.S. civilians. It would
also put an end to the creeping prominence of the functionality
approach, an approach which is too broad to serve as a legitimate
102. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
103. See Christensen, supra note 18, at 18.
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standard to safeguard civilians and far too malleable to legitimately
uphold the principle of distinction under the law of international
armed conflict.104

CONCLUSION
Contemporary armed conflict is characterized as a seemingly
dissonant combination of simultaneous reconstruction and
destruction in order to eliminate those “who pose a threat to [a
nation’s] foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”105 This
paradigm necessarily entails a symbiotic relationship between
civilians and the military—a relationship in which both entities lend
various resources and expertise to a common mission in order to
attain a common goal. In this grey area, which is neither fully
civilian nor military in nature, actors operate under a legal
framework in which their legal status is somewhat indeterminate.
This is especially true for the CRC, a corps of government civilians
whose mission is intimately linked with that of the U.S. military and
national security concerns.
Another grey area exists in the varied U.S. approaches to
interpreting “direct participation in hostilities.” While a more
restrictive interpretation would preserve the privileged status and
protections to which civilians (like those in the CRC) are entitled
under international law, the more expansive views recently posited—
specifically the functionality approach—would serve to deprive them
104. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 11, at 5 (noting the
invocation of the “principle of distinction” in several International Court of Justice
cases to protect the distinction between military combatants and non-military
civilians). Numerous other scholars are actively writing on this issue and proposing
new ways to view the targeting of civilians. See, e.g., Eric T. Jensen, Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Concept Broad Enough for Today’s Targeting
Decisions, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES FROM THE
HAGUE CONVENTIONS TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (William C. Banks ed.,
forthcoming 2010) (proposing that the important threshold question for “targeting
principles” relates to the nature of the actors in the conflict, not the type of conflict
itself); Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1507291
(reviewing
the
distinction between an “innocent civilian” and a “legitimate target,” and suggesting
that the current method of warfare expands the definition of the latter).
105. NSPD 44, supra note 7.
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of those protections. This combination of grey areas—the hybrid
nature of stability operations and an unclear approach to targeting
civilians—leaves entities like the CRC without definite protections
and provides potential legal defenses to insurgents or terrorists who
might otherwise be prosecuted for targeting civilians.
Abandoning the functionality approach would remedy the
problems caused by this conceptual fog and strengthen the
protections of U.S. civilians and the civilians of other nations
working in zones of conflict. As Professor Dinstein has noted,
“[p]recisely because of the desire to confer on civilians in wartime
maximum protection, the international community must tenaciously
oppose any and all attempts to devitalize the principle of
distinction.”106 As a vibrant member of that community, and because
of the many interests at stake, the United States should posit a clearly
defined interpretation of “direct participation in hostilities,” which is
broad enough to enable effective engagement of insurgents yet
restrictive enough to uphold this cardinal principle. Acting otherwise
will only further hinder civilian involvement in stability operations
by leaving them to operate in the conceptual mire of two grey
zones—the thickest grey.

106. DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 256.

